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Abstract
Sanctions are a means to provide incentives towards more pro-social behavior.
Yet their implementation can be a signal that past behavior was undesirable. We
investigate experimentally the importance of the informational content of the choice
to sanction. We place this in a context of a coordination game to focus attention on
beliefs and information and less on intrinsic or pro-social motivations. We compare
the eect of sanctions that are introduced exogenously by the experimenter to that
of sanctions which have been actively chosen by a subject who takes the role of a
ctitious policy maker with superior information about the previous eort of the
other players. We nd that cooperative subjects perceive actively chosen sanctions
as a negative signal which eliminates for them the incentive eect of sanctions.
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11 Introduction
Many economic and social interactions involve situations with multiple equilibria, some
more ecient than others. An important task of policy makers is to induce cooperative
behavior associated with more ecient equilibria. Typically, economists focus their policy
analysis on the use of penalties or rewards that alter agents' behavior by changing the
material trade-os that agents are facing - an `incentive eect'. However, material trade-
os are not the only determinant of behavior. Equilibrium play also critically depends on
the beliefs and expectations that agents in a society have about the behavior of others.
Policies that change these beliefs may induce shifts in behavior - a `belief eect'.
Such belief eects may counteract the incentive eect. In particular, the discretionary
introduction of a policy, rule or system of incentives may lead people to infer something
about the reasons for the introduction, and may be a signal that other people are not
behaving well. For example, to increase punishment for some crime can inform the public
that this crime is prevalent. To nancially intervene in a country can inform the rest
of the world that their distress is worse than believed. To increase monitoring on immi-
grant groups may have a stigmatizing eect and lead people to believe that these groups
have bad intentions. Such belief eects may reduce the motivations of people to behave
cooperatively, and counteract the incentive eect of the policy.
It is this tension between incentive and belief eects that we study in this paper. Our
experimental setup is a two person minimum eort game: a coordination game with many
Pareto ranked equilibria, based on Goeree and Holt (2001, 2005). Each player chooses a
level of costly eort, and is rewarded according to the minimum of the eorts of all players
in the group. The more ecient equilibria result only if all players play individually risky
strategies. Doubt about the other player's willingness to play such a strategy may result
in inecient outcomes. Thus, the game is particularly suitable as a workhorse, because
there are multiple equilibria and players' eorts are strategic complements.
In all experimental treatments agents were matched in groups of three, where the third
player was a `principal' who benetted proportionally to the minimum eort chosen by
the other two in the group. The subjects played the minimum eort game twice, but
the principal was the only one to be informed of the outcome of the rst round before
the second round was played. This information structure was common knowledge. Apart
from eort choices, we also elicited the subjects' beliefs about the eort of the other
2player.
In the context of this game, we consider the following research questions about the
eects of sanctions:
1. Can the introduction of incentives associated with small, non-deterrent1 sanctions
induce desired behavior and make agents more optimistic about other players' ac-
tions?
2. In situations of imperfect information about the past behavior of other group mem-
bers, can the introduction of sanctions make agents more pessimistic about the
actions of others by implicitly signaling that other players have not been cooperat-
ing? If so, does this reduce the eectiveness of sanctions?
Question 1 addresses the direct incentive eect of changing material trade-os, but
also a forward looking belief eect. Since eorts are compliments, anticipation of the other
agent's reaction to the incentive eect will increase the own motivation to exert eort.
To answer Question 1, we compare a control treatment without sanctions with a
sanction treatment. In a control treatment no sanctions were introduced between rounds,
and consequently the second round was the same as the rst. In the treatment, a mild
sanction F was introduced for both players in the group, that lowered the earnings of a
subject if she selected low eort (and also carried a small xed cost for the principal).
Because the sanction was introduced by the experimenter unconditional on past eort
choices by the subjects, we call this the `exogenous sanction' treatment.
Our hypotheses for the eect of such sanctions are based on a simple formal model,
explained in Section 4. Because there are many Nash equilibria in this game, standard
analysis does not help us very much. Instead, we use a model similar to level-k reasoning
(Nagel 1995, Costa-Gomez and Crawford 2006), where we assume that people think of
their partner as either a pessimistic type, who believes the partner will play low eort, or
an optimistic type, who believes their partner will play high eort. This model predicts
that sanctions should increase eort both through an incentive and through a belief eect.
The rst result of the paper is that we do indeed nd both eects in the data, and so our
answer to Question 1 is armative.
1By `small', `non-deterrent' or `mild', we mean that sanctions do not make playing the highest possible
eort a dominant strategy.
3Question 2 addresses backward looking belief eect, or signaling eect, of sanctions.
To answer it, we introduced an additional treatment. Before the second round of the
minimum eort game was played, the principal could decide whether or not to introduce
the same sanction F as above, at a small cost to his own earnings. Because the principal
had observed rst round behavior and could condition the sanction on this behavior, we
call this the `endogenous sanction' treatment.
Our model predicts that in this treatment there exists an equilibrium in which the
principal will sanction if and only if there is at least one player who plays relatively
low eort. Therefore, a player who played relatively high eort in the rst round, but
nevertheless observes a sanction, will learn that his partner is a pessimistic type who
is likely to continue to play low eort: sanctions are `bad news'. This means that for
these players the incentive eect of the sanction will be counteracted by the backwards
looking belief eect. By contrast, people who initially played low eort will not get
any information from a sanction, because in equilibrium it would have been introduced
independently of their partner's behavior. In this way, our design is able to identify a
signaling eect of sanctions.
Our second result is that the data are consistent with a backward looking belief eect
for those who played relatively high eort in the rst round. Moreover, this eect is strong
enough that for these players it eliminates the incentive eect of the endogenous sanction.
In accordance with the theory, for those who played low rst round eort the eect of an
endogenous sanction is the same as that of the exogenous sanction.
To our knowledge this is the rst paper that looks empirically at the tension between
the signaling eect and incentive eect of sanctions. The main message is that the ef-
fectiveness of sanctions depends on the context in which they are introduced. On the
one hand, people recognize the incentive eects that sanctions will have on others, which
increases their eectiveness. On the other hand, when information about the behavior of
others is limited, as is the case in modern large-scale societies or rms, the introduction
of sanctions may cause pessimism by drawing attention to past misbehaviors. This is
especially true for those that are optimistic and behave cooperatively. This nding im-
plies a dicult balancing act that a government or principal must perform: It must try
too keep the optimists optimistic, while at the same time encouraging the pessimists to
change their behavior.
A nal contribution of this paper is the use of nonparametric tests developed by Schlag
4(2008) that are able, unlike the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (WMW test, Wilcoxon
1945, Mann and Whitney 1947), to identify how distributions dier. No distributional
assumptions are made and levels of signicance are mathematically correct for the given
sample sizes. These tests allow to identify statistically signicant evidence that outcomes
in one sample tend to be higher than they are in the other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we relate our paper
to an existing theoretical literature on the signaling eect of sanctions in economics, and
the literature on `expressive law'. In Section 3 we outline the details of the experiment.
In Section 4 we formulate explicit testable hypotheses, based on a formal model explained
in more detail in Appendix A. Section 5 presents the results, followed by the conclusion
in Section 6.
2 Literature
Our experimental study relates to several strands of the literature. First, it is closely re-
lated to a theoretical literature in economics on the potential signaling that occurs when
imposing a sanction, or more generally when introducing some policy. B enabou and Tirole
(2003) show how the choice of incentives can provide information to an agent about his or
her type. Friebel and Schnedler (2007), Sliwka (2007) and Van der Weele (2011) investi-
gate how the choice of incentive policies can signal information of the policy maker about
the relative prevalence of dierent types in the population to the imperfectly informed
agents. In each of these papers, the signaling eect of sanctions depends on the existence
of agents with dierent preferences. In equilibrium, sanctions are a signal that there are
many selsh types around, which reduces the motivation of the agents to exert eort,
either because of conformistic preferences or because of complementaries in technology.
The common nding in this literature is that the signaling eect of sanction leads the
principal to use sanctions less often relative to situation where the agents are perfectly
informed. We complement this theoretical literature by showing that the signaling eect
can also obtain in a setting in which all agents have identical preferences, and only dier
according to their beliefs.
Our paper is also related to eld experiments on crowding out eect of sanctions
(see Frey and Jegen (2001) and Bowles (2008) for a survey). A well-known instance of
this literature is Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), who empirically show that a monetary
5incentive lowers acceptance rates of nuclear repository wastes. Another much cited paper
is Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), who showed that a ne for picking up children late from
a day-care center actually increased late-coming. Although potentially the mechanism
we are looking for may be at work, these papers cannot dierentiate it from potential
alternative explanations, such as a direct impact of incentives on preferences, or the idea
that a ne is a signal about some relevant characteristic of the principal. By contrast,
our explicit distinction between exogenous and endogenous sanctions and the use of a
between subject design allows us to identify that sanctions carry signals about the past
behavior of other agents.
Thirdly, we contribute to the experimental literature on the eect of incentives in
coordination games (see Devetag and Ortman (2007) for a survey of experimental results
in coordination games). Goeree and Holt (2001, 2005) nd in a between subject design
that eort levels in a minimum eort game are higher when eort costs are lower. By
contrast, our Question 1 refers to the eect of the introduction of sanctions, hence refers
to a within subject design. Given our ndings, one may conjecture that an exogenous
lowering of eort costs will increase eort.
Fourth, our work relates to the literature in legal scholarship on the focal point theory of
law (McAdams 2000 and McAdams and Nadler, 2003). According to this theory, laws can
be used to coordinate expectations on a benecial equilibrium, a phenomenon we referred
to above as the forward looking belief eect of sanctions. In an experiment by Bohnet and
Cooter (2001), penalties for choosing the inecient strategy in a coordination game induce
more people to choose the ecient strategy. However, to isolate the forward looking belief
eect the payos were changed and a lump sum transfer was made to compensate the
expected cost of the penalty. In this paper we look at a more conventional penalty that
is not oset by a lump-sum transfer. We conrm the existence of a forward looking belief
eect, and establish the existence of an incentive eect.
A nal strand of literature in law that is of interest to our paper is that on `expressive
law' (e.g. Sunstein 1996, Cooter 1998). The idea here is that laws express the reigning
norms in a society, and can discipline people by showing them what the majority of people
deem to be `appropriate'. Tyran and Feld (2006) test this reasoning in a public good game
experiment that compares the eects of exogenously introduced `mild' sanctions with the
same sanctions introduced endogenously through group voting. The authors show that
endogenous sanctions are more eective in raising contributions, because the preceding
6vote signals that there are many people who want to cooperate. This setup is quite
dierent from ours where sanctions are implemented by an outsider who is more informed
about previous behavior. In this context the introduction of sanctions sends a negative
rather than a positive signal about the intentions of others.
To our knowledge, Xiao (2010) is the only other paper that studies signaling eect
of sanctions by superiorly informed third parties. In a sender-receiver game, an outside
`enforcer' can punish a sender who sends false messages to the receiver. The payos of the
enforcer does not depend on whether the sender deceives, and so it is not so surprising
that one of the results of the experiment is that sanctions become a signal of the sender's
deception. By contrast, in our study, the interests of the players and the enforcer are
aligned and thus sanctions have a dual role of both signaling information and enhancing
coordination. It is the tension between these two roles that is the focus of this paper.
At this point we would like to mention that all experimental papers above build their
claims by verifying signicant dierences in population means using the WMW test, which
cannot uncover such evidence without making additional assumptions.
3 Experimental Setup
The study of sanctions comes up in settings that can often be described as either a
coordination game or a Prisoners' dilemma. We chose a coordination game as an object
of study, because in such games the rational choice depends only on the beliefs about
the actions of the other player(s) in the game. This allows us to isolate the sanctions'
eects on behavior that derive from the change in a subject's belief, and we can disregard
issues to do with social preferences and/or dominant strategies that usually play a role in
Prisoners' dilemmas.
3.1 The Experimental Game
As the coordination game underlying our experiment we choose the minimum eort game
of Goeree and Holt (2001, 2005). Large action spaces help capture variation in players'
beliefs. In this game, two players simultaneously choose an action, to be interpreted as
an eort level, between 110 and 170 (the bounds are chosen such that there are no clear
focal points). Subjects' payos are equal the minimum of these two eorts, minus the
7amount of their own eort times a cost parameter k 2 [0;1], which is the same for both
players.
While in the original setting by Goeree and Holt (2001) the game is played only once,
in our experiment the game is played twice where treatments dier according to what
happens in the second round. In some treatments a value F is subtracted from the payos
in the second round, where F = 0:5  (170   ei). The subtraction of F can be interpreted
as a sanction, deviations from the maximal eort (170) are punished proportionally. In
fact, the sanction is mild as the game remains a coordination game with the same set of
pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Another dierence to Goeree and Holt (2001) is that we include a third player so that
the game becomes a three player game. Depending on the treatment, the third player
is either active or inactive. When active, the third player can choose before the start of
the second round whether or not to introduce a sanction for both players in the group.
When inactive, the third player does not make any choice, instead the choice of whether
to introduce a sanction is made by the experimenter. Regardless of her activity status,
player 3 receives a payo proportional to the minimum eort chosen by the other two
players. Note that player 3 is present in each treatment to maintain the same context.
In sum, payos in round 1 are determined as follows:
i (ei;e i) = minfei;e ig   0:85  ei for i = 1;2;
3 (e1;e2) = 0:25  minfe1;e2g;
where i (e1;e2) is the payo of player i, ei 2 [110;170] is the eort level chosen by player
i; i = 1;2, and k = 0:85 is the cost of eort. Payos in round 2 are given by the following
equations:
i (ei;e i;s) = minfei;e ig   0:85  ei   s  0:5  (170   ei) for i = 1;2;
3 (e1;e2;s) = 0:25  minfe1;e2g   4s;
where 4 is the cost of introducing a sanction for the third player and s 2 f0;1g reects
whether a sanction was introduced (s = 1) or not (s = 0).
An important element of the experimental design is the information structure. Players
do not know before the rst round that there will be a second round. They are informed
of this only after the rst round has concluded. Furthermore, players 1 and 2 do not
observe each other's eort levels, nor do they learn their own payos before both rounds
8are over. When active, player 3 is informed about the eort levels of players 1 and 2 in
round 1 while these two players only observe before round 2 starts whether or not player
3 has chosen to introduce a sanction.
3.1.1 Parameters, Treatments, and Procedures
We wanted eort choices to be low in round one in order to give player 3 an incentive to
introduce a sanction when she is active. Following Goeree and Holt (2001), eort levels
tend to be low when the cost of eort is high, hence we decided to set the cost of eort
k equal to 0:85. Sanctioning should be moderately costly for player 3 so that there is
sucient diversity in the choices of player 3. Accordingly we chose to set the cost for
the third player of introducing a sanction equal to 4; which is comparable to reduction of
4=0:25 = 16 in the minimal eort of players 1 and 2.
We now describe the treatments. Treatments only dier in the second round, in the
rst round they are all the same: players 1 and 2 play the minimum eort game and player
3 is inactive. In the control treatment there is no sanction in the second round, and player
3 is inactive. That is, the second round is conducted exactly as the rst. In particular
subjects are not aware of the fact that sanctions are introduced in other treatments. We
refer to this treatment as the exogenous no-sanction (ExNS) treatment. In the treatment
we refer to as the exogenous sanction (ExS) treatment the sanction is introduced in the
second round. Players one and two are told that the term F is additionally subtracted
from their payos, player three remains inactive as in ExNS. We use the term exogenous
to indicate that the choice to (not) introduce a sanction is not conditional in any way on
previous decisions by the subjects. This was clear to the subjects because all subjects
that belonged to the same session received the same instructions and this was common
knowledge as instructions were read publicly. In the third treatment, player 3 who is
present but inactive in the other two treatments, receives an active role. After round 1,
player 3 observes the eort levels chosen by players 1 and 2 in the rst round, whereupon
she is asked to decide whether to a) introduce the sanction F to the payos of players
1 and 2 at a cost 4 to her own payos, or b) to leave the payo structure unaltered.
After player 3 has taken her decision, players 1 and 2 are informed of it and choose their
eort levels. We refer to this treatment as the endogenous treatment. We slightly abuse
common terminology and refer by the endogenous sanction treatment (EnS) to the case
where player 3 introduced the sanction while we speak of the endogenous no-sanction
9treatment (EnNS) if no sanction was introduced.
Because the experiment features just two rounds of play, it was very important that
people understood the game correctly from the start. For this purpose we ran a tutorial
before the rst round. In the tutorial, participants had 5 minutes to choose hypothetical
eort choices of players 1 and 2 and to calculate their payos resulting from these choices.
The tutorial took place before assigning subjects to a role, so that also players 3 would have
practice in the calculation of payos of players 1 and 2. In addition to this tutorial, the
input screens in the actual experiment provided subjects with the possibility to calculate
their payos from a given choice. That is, after entering and before conrming their
choices, subjects could enter a hypothetical choice of the other player and let the computer
calculate their payos resulting from these choices.
The experiment was conducted in several sessions at the economics lab of the university
of Siena, Italy between May and November 2007. Within each session subjects were
matched into groups of 3, faced the same treatment and played the two round game
described above a single time. Before playing the game the instructions were read out
loud and the tutorial was conducted. The instructions and the input screen are provided
in appendix C. Subjects entered their eort and belief choices on a computer that was
running on the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The subjects received a show up fee of
1 euro, their earnings were in tokens as specied above, which were converted into Euro's
at the end of the experiment at an exchange rate of 10 tokens = 0.75 Euro.
3.1.2 Elicitation of a Belief Interval
Apart from the eort choices, we are interested in the eect of sanctions on players' beliefs.
Therefore, in each round we ask each player who chooses an eort about her beliefs about
the eort of the other player in that round. Rather than elicit a point belief, we decided
to elicit an interval. More precisely, players 1 and 2 have to specify a range (i.e. a lower
bound L and an upper bound U) in which the eort chosen by the other player is believed
to fall. Elicitation is remunerated as follows:
i(L;U;e i) =
(
0 if e i = 2 [L;U]
0:15  (60   (U   L)) if e i 2 [L;U]
where i(L;U;e i) is the payo of player i who species a range [L;U] when e i is the
eort chosen by the player matched with player i: Note that the payo is zero when the
10eort of the other player falls outside the specied range. Accuracy is rewarded as the
payo of a correct guess, the payo received when the eort of the other lies within the
range, is decreasing in the width of the interval. Thus, a smaller range increases the
payo of a correct guess but also increases the risk of not being correct and hence of not
earning additional tokens. As such, this elicitation method is both simple and can capture
dispersion in beliefs as measured by U   L.
We opted against eliciting point beliefs as concern in the minimum eort game is less
for mean or median eort than for the lower tail of the belief distribution. In fact, Schlag
and van der Weele (2009) have investigated the predictive power of this rule. They nd
that any risk neutral or risk averse rational decision maker who is incentivized by the
above rule and who has single peaked beliefs about the eort of the other player will
make a correct guess at least 50% of the time. In other words, [L;U] will contain at least
50% of the mass of her belief distribution.
In our analysis we focus on the lower bound L of the belief interval as the lower tail
of the belief distribution is what matters in a minimum eort game. In the following, the
term belief refers to the value of L:
4 Hypotheses
The hypotheses we present in the this section are based on a formal model. We believe
the intuitions from this model are relatively straightforward, and do not want to clutter
the analysis at this point, so we relegate a formal treatment to Appendix A. Note that the
model makes some simplifying assumptions regarding risk neutrality, and the distribution
of levels of rationality to keep the complexity of analysis within the scope of this paper.
Because there are many Nash equilibria in the experimental game, standard analysis
does not bring us very far. Instead, we rely on a model that resembles k-level thinking
models (Nagel 1995, Costa Gomes and Crawford 2006). Specically, we assume that each
player assumes that the other player (also referred to as partner) is best responding to one
of two distinct belief distributions that are xed over time. Accordingly, players believe
that their partner chooses one of two eort levels which we refer to as `high' eort and
`low' eort.
Consider rst choices in round one. Following the fact that subjects did not know that
there would be a second round, we ignore strategic considerations with respect to round
11two. For simplicity, players are assumed to be risk neutral. Therefore, in round one, a
player will choose between the same two eort levels that the partner is believed to be
choosing. In particular, the high eort is chosen if and only if the probability that the
partner is choosing this eort is suciently high.
Consider now round two. As choices will depend on the treatment, we rst look at
exogenous sanctions. The sanction reduces the marginal cost of eort which results in
both an incentive and a belief eect. The incentive eect describes the change in behavior
that results if beliefs would remain unchanged. Lower marginal eort costs means that
some players have an incentive to switch from low to high eort while none will switch
from high to low eort. The belief eect refers to change in behavior driven by players
changing their beliefs about their partner's behavior. As we explained above, players
believe that their partner maintains the same beliefs as he or she had in round one. Given
the reduction in marginal cost of eort, players anticipate that their potential partner
will exert higher eort (through the incentive eect) which additionally increases their
own incentive to increase their eort. Because each player assumes that the partner
best-responds to xed belief distributions, no further iterations in strategic reasoning are
necessary.
It follows that an exogenous sanction will increase both own eort and the beliefs about
the eort of the other player. Under a mild assumption on the consistency of beliefs in
round one (as specied in the appendix), the average eort of the players increases more
than their average beliefs do. The reason for this is that eort is increased through both
the incentive and the belief eect, whereas beliefs are only aected by the latter. This
leads to our rst hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Exogenous sanctions increase beliefs and eorts. This eect is more pro-
nounced for eort levels than it is for belief levels.
Consider now the treatment with endogenous sanctions. We wish to determine when
the third player, or principal, will choose to sanction and how players one and two will
react to the non-introduction of sanctions. We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria that
do not depend on the prior beliefs of the principal about the beliefs of the agents. We
nd three candidate equilibrium behaviors for the third player: \always sanction", \never
sanction" and \sanction when at least one player exerts low eort". For instance, un-
conditional sanctioning is best if lower eort costs raise partner's eort suciently to
12oset the cost of sanctioning for the third player. For this to happen, the third player
has to anticipate an increase in eort by at least 4=0:25 = 16 points as a result of the
sanction. The equilibrium involving \sanction when at least one player exerts low eort"
exists when (i) a player with low eort is suciently responsive to a sanction and (ii) the
dierence in eort between low and high eort players is suciently large. The intuition
behind these equilibrium conditions will become clearer below.
Common to these three equilibria is that low eorts are always sanctioned if sanctions
are chosen. This leads to our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 In the endogenous treatment, the likelihood of sanctions being imposed by
the principal is decreasing in the minimal eort chosen in the rst round.
We now turn to the reaction of players one and two to the sanctioning choice, which
naturally depends on the principal's equilibrium policy. In the \always sanction"or \never
sanction"equilibrium, no information about partner behavior is transmitted to the players.
In this case, endogenous sanctions have the same eect as exogenous sanctions. Informa-
tion about partner behavior is transmitted only under \sanction when at least one player
exerts low eort", and it is only transmitted to a player who exerted high eort. In this
equilibrium, absence of a sanction reveals to a player with high eort that the matched
partner exerted high eort while a sanction indirectly informs the player that his or her
partner chose low eort. On the other hand, players that exerted low eort are sanctioned
regardless of the behavior of their partner. Thus, sanctions are `bad news' for someone
who chose high eort in the rst round and carry no news for those that chose low eort.
In summary, we can say that a sanction is never good news about the eort of the
partner, and is bad news when own eort is high and the third player is believed to
\sanction if at least one player exerted low eort". Careful inspection of the equilibrium
behavior of agents leads to the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3 a) For those that chose a low eort in the rst round, the change in eorts
and beliefs under endogenous sanctions will be similar to the change under exogenous
sanctions.
b) For those that chose a high eort in the rst round, the change in eorts and beliefs
will be larger under exogenous sanctions than under endogenous sanctions.
13Note that the model also predicts that eort among those not sanctioned will not
change. However, we do not formally test this hypothesis as our primary interest is the
eect of sanctions.
5 Results
In this section we present the results of our experiment, both descriptively and statistically,
guided by the general research question outlined in the introduction and more formally
identied by the hypotheses formulated in Section 4. Formal statistical analysis plays
an important role in uncovering the ndings. We choose not to add any distributional
or parametric assumptions and to build on methodology that enables correct statistical
inference for the given sample sizes. In particular, we do not assume that errors are
normally distributed, neither do we rely on asymptotic theory that assumes that samples
are suciently large. Using methods that are correct is also referred to as `exact statistics'.
The term `correct' refers here to the use of statistical tests that can formally be proven
to have the level of signicance that they are claimed to have.
Samples gathered in our experiment are small. Instead of using mean tests we consider
new nonparametric tests that have been specically designed for small samples (Schlag
2008). The power of these tests stems from the fact that they are based on ordinal com-
parisons and hence are less sensitive to unobserved values. Instead of testing whether
there is a dierence in means we investigate which of two random observations is likely
to be larger. Formally, given two random variables Y1 and Y2 we test the null hypothe-
sis that Pr(Y2 > Y1)  Pr(Y2 < Y1): A rejection presents signicant evidence that data
drawn from Y2 tends to be larger than data drawn from Y1: This so-called test of stochas-
tic inequality is explained in more detail in Appendix B. All our results are consistent
with those that can be obtained using the WMW test. Note however, that contrary to
conventional wisdom, the WMW test is not an exact test for comparing means unless one
is willing to add distributional assumptions.2
2Counter examples are easily presented, for a simulation study showing this we refer to Forsythe et al.
(1994). The WMW test is exact for testing identity of two distributions. A rejection provides signicant
evidence that the two distributions are not identical without providing results on how they dier.
145.1 Initial Observations
The number of participants in the experiment was 243: 45 in treatment 1 (ExNS), 51 in
treatment 2 (ExS), and 147 in treatment 3 where the principal decided to introduce a
sanction in 29 out of 49 groups. Hence, we had 29 observations of EnS and 20 of ExNS.
Each experimental session lasted roughly 35 minutes and the subjects earned 7:5 euros
on average3. As we already mentioned, in order to maximize the understanding of the
game participants played a 5 minutes tutorial before starting the experiment and being
assigned to a role. As an indication of whether people understood the game, we checked
whether there were `anomalous observations': people who specied an eort choice above
the upper bound of their belief interval. We found just 6 such observations. Average
eort in round one across all treatments was 145 with a large clustering of observations
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Figure 1: Histogram of rst round eort choices of all subjects.
3If this seems little, remember that the incentives were concentrated on only two (eort) choices. At
each of these choices there was thus relatively a lot at stake.
4The average eort levels are higher than those in Goeree and Holt (2001) who implemented a cost
of eort of 0:9. Reasons may be that the cost of eort is slightly lower in our setup and that in the
instructions we did not use the word \cost" when referring to k.
15There is a high correlation between beliefs (as identied by the lower bound L of
the elicited belief interval) and eorts in the rst round of each treatment, as one would
expect in a minimum eort game. The correlation coecient is 0:85, which is signicant
at the 1% level.5
Treatment 1; in which there is no active principal and where there is no sanction,
constitutes the benchmark for comparison with the other treatments. Play within this
benchmark is of interest in its own right and relevant when comparing to these other
treatments. Table 1 contains the average eort and beliefs in each of the two rounds
where mean ExNS1 (ExNS2) denotes the mean of the rst (second) round variables in
the exogenous no-sanction treatment. The last column contains the estimated stochastic
n Mean ExNS1 Mean ExNS2
Stochastic Dierence
ExNS1 vs ExNS2
Eort 23 133 137 0:22
Belief 29 134 138 0:34
Table 1: Mean eorts, mean beliefs, and stochastic dierence between round 1 (ExNS1) and 2
(ExNS2) in the exogenous no-sanction treatment. The results refer to two-sided test against the
null-hypothesis that changes between rounds are 0.  Denotes signicance at 10%,  denotes
signicance at 5%,  denotes signicance at 1%:
dierence between rounds one and two, formally this is the estimate of  = Pr(Y2 >
Y1)   Pr(Y2 < Y1)) where Yi is the eort level of a random subject in round i; i = 1;2:
Testing the null hypothesis that  = 0 is here equivalent to performing a sign test as the
data is given in matched pairs. We nd no marginally signicant dierence. Similarly, the
WMW test does not detect any statistically signicant dierence at 10%. On the other
hand we do nd some marginally signicant evidence that the beliefs tend to be higher
in the second round. However, as we can see from Table 1, the changes in beliefs are so
small that people are not suciently optimistic to change their eort levels by much.
Before moving to the analysis of our hypotheses we mention some issues that arise
when analyzing changes between rounds. Recall that our hypotheses do not refer to
5The signicance is based on an exact test of Schlag (2008) which has as null hypothesis that the
covariance is less than 0. Note that this is not the null hypothesis underlying the Spearman rank
correlation test (Spearman, 1904).
16behavior of players 1 and 2 in round two but instead to change in their behavior between
rounds one and two.
First of all, the observations for the group members in the third treatment are not
necessarily independent. The eort decision of a subject in the rst round can inuence
the sanctioning decision of the third player. This in turn can inuence the eort and
beliefs of the other subject in the second round. In our statistical testing we correct for
this dependence by considering the average eort level within each group, thus analyzing
the data at group level.
Second, interpreting changes in eorts and belief intervals as reaction to the experi-
mental setting is not straightforward. We predict that people will move up their eort in
a reaction to the introduction of exogenous sanctions. However, people who chose eort
close to 170 in the rst round will not be able to move up their eort any further, which
means that these subjects do not have the ability to respond to incentives. We would like
to restrict attention to those subjects who actually have room to respond. In practice this
means that we restrict attention to those with rst round eort below an upper bound of
165 (indicated in Figure 1) in our analysis of eorts and rst round beliefs below 165 in
our analysis of beliefs (thereby excluding 39 and 11 observations respectively).6 Note that
those with rst round eort near 110 also face a constraint, but this is less problematic
since we hypothesize that people move up in reaction to incentives. In fact, subjects do
not seem to be constrained. We nd that no subjects with low eort (see below) in the
rst round decreased their eort and only 3 subjects who had low beliefs in the rst round
decreased their beliefs in round two.
Third of all, our hypotheses instruct us to dierentiate between high and low eort.
As cuto between the two regions we consider the sample median eort of the remaining
subjects in round one which was 135. Thus, in the remainder we dene high eort players
as those who chose eort in the rst round in f135;:::;165g (i.e. above the median), and
low eort players as those chose rst round eort in f110;:::;134g (i.e. below the median).
6The results do not depend on the choice of 165 as a threshold, but hold for any upper bound between
165 and 168, when we take the median of the associated sample as a threshold between high and low
eort players.
175.2 The Incentive Eect of Sanctions
In order to separate the incentive eect of non-deterrent sanctions (Question 1) from their
signaling eect we designed treatment 2 (ExS) in which sanctions are imposed uncondi-
tionally by the experimenters. To identify such an incentive eect we compare behavior
in this treatment to that in treatment 1 (ExNS) so as to control for changes in behavior
between rounds that occur when subjects face the same environment a second time.
Figure 2 shows the change in the mean belief and mean eort between round 1 and
round 2 for the two treatments ExNS and ExS. The number on top of the bar indicates
the number of independent observations. This number diers within the same treatment
between beliefs and eorts due to the dierent number of subjects excluded who had rst
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Figure 2: The change in beliefs and sanctions for the whole sample, except those who chose
rst round eorts 2 f166;167;:::;170g or rst round beliefs 2 f166;167;:::;170g. (Number of
independent observations for each sample at the top of the bar).
In Table 2 we report the estimated stochastic dierences between ExNS and ExS
with their respective signicant levels. To indicate changes between the two rounds of
a treatment X we use the notation dX. For instance, the estimated stochastic dierence





Table 2: Values of stochastic dierence between changes in the exogenous no-sanction (ExNS)
treatment and changes in the exogenous sanction (ExS) treatment for a one-sided test against
the null-hypothesis that the changes in ExS are smaller or equal than in EnNS.  Denotes
signicance at 10%,  denotes signicance at 5%,  denotes signicance at 1%:
under exogenous sanction (ExS) equals 0:64. We are able to reject the null hypothesis that
the stochastic dierences is nonpositive at level 1%: Thus, we have strongly signicant
evidence that exogenous sanctions make eorts change more than they would without
sanctions. The impact of sanctions on change in beliefs is only marginally signicant.
Looking at the estimated change in means (Figure 2) and stochastic dierences (Table
2) we observe that sanctions have a stronger impact on eorts than they do on beliefs.
Testing this formally, we nd that the null hypothesis that the change is equal or higher
for beliefs is rejected at the 10% level, with the stochastic dierence being 0:35.
Summary 1 Regarding Hypothesis 1 we nd a strongly signicant incentive eect of
sanctions on eort and a marginally signicant forward looking belief eect. There is
marginally signicant evidence that the eect is stronger for eort than it is for beliefs.
5.3 The Signaling Eect of Sanctions
We now come to the second main objective of this paper, to investigate the signaling
eect of sanctions. For this we investigate behavior in treatment 3, using treatments 1
and 2 as controls. Signaling occurs when the principal conditions the choice of whether to
sanction on the eort levels of the two players chosen in round one. Signaling has an eect
when subjects make inferences about the eort of the other player when observing the
choice of the principal whether or not to sanction. Note that the information contained
in the choice of the principal need not be consistent with how subjects interpret why
the principal chose to or not to sanction. In particular, this means that we have to
separately analyze (i) the sanctioning choice of the principal and (ii) how subjects react
19to the choice of the principal. To separate the informational content of the sanction in
(ii) from its incentive eect we will compare behavior to that in treatments 1 and 2 where
the principal is inactive.
5.3.1 The Choice of When to Sanction
We wish to uncover regularities in the sanctioning choice of the principal. In particular
we are interested in whether, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, that sanctions are more likely
when the minimal eort in round one is low. In order to test Hypothesis 2, we compare
the minimum rst round eort in the sanctioned groups to the minimum rst round eort
of non-sanctioned groups.
We use the WMW test because we are interested in uncovering that the choice to
sanction is not independent of the minimal eort choice, hence that the two distributions
of minimal eort are not identical. However, we cannot nd (marginally) signicant
evidence that the distributions of minimal eort are dierent in the groups where sanctions
are imposed as compared to the group without sanctions imposed (the p-value is 0:63).
Of course the samples are small, so the test is not very powerful. However, the descriptive
data in Table 3 do not point at large dierences either.
Mean of Min.
Group Eort
# Below 165 # Above 166
No Sanction 138 17 3
Sanction 135 28 1
Table 3: Descriptive data on rst round minimum eort of sanctioned and non-sanctioned
groups. The columns show the mean, and the number of groups with minimum eort below 165
and above 166.
Summary 2 We have no statistically signicant evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2, that
sanctioned groups had lower minimum eort. The descriptive statistics similarly indicate
a lack of a clear pattern. It is as if sanctions have been imposed independently of the
minimum eort.
Hence we cannot conrm Hypothesis 2. However, note that this result does not con-
tradict our theoretical framework outlined in Appendix A, since this admits equilibria in
20which sanctions are chosen independent of eort levels. An explanation for the lack of
pattern may be the established tendency of people to sanction \too often" in economic
experiments (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003).
5.3.2 Reacting to the Information Perceived in the Choice of the Principal
We now turn to investigate whether subjects perceive an informational content in the
choice of the principal. Although our analysis above indicates that there is no clear
informational content, subjects may still believe that sanctions were imposed as a reaction
to low minimum eort levels. Specically, subjects may follow the same reasoning that
led us to formulate Hypothesis 2. If this is the case, sanctions may still inuence beliefs
about the other group member. Following Hypothesis 3 the predicted eect depends on
whether a subject chose low or high eort in round one.
Consider the behavior of low eort players. Figure 3 presents the mean changes in
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Figure 3: Means of changes in beliefs and eort across treatments, for those who played low
eort (2 f110;111;:::;134g) in the rst round. (Number of independent observations for each
sample at the top of the bar).
Figure 3 reveals no large dierences between the exogenous and endogenous sanction
treatments. The results in Table 4 show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
21identical distributions in the exogenous and endogenous treatments, using the WMW





Table 4: p-values of the two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test for the null hypothesis that the
eects of the exogenous and endogenous sanction treatment are identical among those that chose
low eort (2 f110;111;:::;134g) in the rst round.  Denotes signicance at 10%,  denotes
signicance at 5%,  denotes signicance at 1%:
Note that the above does not conrm Hypothesis 3a); that there is no eect for low
eort players. Condence intervals could be useful if samples were substantially larger. To
obtain some indication in line with Hypothesis 3a) we contrast the stochastic dierence of
the change in behavior of these two treatments and report results in Table 5. Estimates
Stochastic Dierence
ExS1 vs. ExS2 EnS1 vs. EnS2
Eort 1 1
Belief 0:5 0:8
Table 5: Estimates of stochastic dierence between round 1 and round 2 of treatments ExS
and EnS, for those who played low eort (2 f110;111;:::;134g). Results are for a one-sided test
against the null-hypothesis that choices in the second round are lower or equal to that in the
rst round.  Denotes signicance at 10%,  denotes signicance at 5%,  Denotes signicance
at 1%:.
and levels of signicance are very similar. Eectivity of sanctions on low eort players
does not seem to depend on whether the sanctions were endogenous or exogenous.
Summary 3 Regarding Hypothesis 3a, for subjects who made low eorts in the rst round
we nd no statistically signicant evidence that endogenous and exogenous sanctions have
dierent eects on either eorts or beliefs. There is some indication that lack of signicant
22dierence is not due to small sample sizes but that in fact behavior is the same under
endogenous and exogenous sanctions.
Consider now the behavior of high eort players. In Figure 4 we report average changes
in eorts and beliefs across treatments for subjects who played high eorts in the rst
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Mean Comparison by Treatment
Figure 4: Means of changes in beliefs and eort across treatments, for those who played
high eort (2 f135;136;:::;165g) in the rst round. (Number of independent observations
for each sample at the top of the bar).
the endogenous ones for those who played high eort. Our statistical analysis based on
stochastic dierences, reported in Table 6, conrms this. We observe signicant evidence
that exogenous sanctions are more eective in raising eort than endogenous sanctions.
There is marginal signicant evidence that beliefs tend to change more under exogenous
than under endogenous sanctions. One wonders whether endogenous sanctions have any
eect at all. To nd out we test if there is a dierence between the endogenous sanction
treatment and the baseline treatment (ExNS). In the rst column of Table 7 we report
the p-values of the WMW test for this comparison (stochastic dierences are similarly
insignicant). There is no statistically signicant evidence that endogenous sanctions are





Table 6: Estimates of stochastic dierence between the exogenous and endogenous sanction
treatments for those who played high eort (2 f135;136;:::;165g) in the rst round. Results
are for a one-sided test against the null-hypothesis that dExS is lower than or equal to dEnS. 







Table 7: Comparison of the baseline (ExNS) treatment and the sanction treatments for those
who played high eort (2 f135;136;:::;165g) in the rst round. Results in the rst column are
for a two-sided WMW test that EnS do not dier from ExNS, those in the second column are
for a one-sided test against the null-hypothesis that dExS is lower than or equal to dExNS. 
Denotes signicance at 10%,  denotes signicance at 5%,  denotes signicance at 1%:
we would not be able to reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions, even if the actual
dierence is quite large. To counter this criticism, the last column of Table 7 shows the
same stochastic dierence when the sanction is imposed exogenously. In this case, despite
the small sample sizes, we have statistically signicant evidence that exogenous sanctions
are eective among the high eort players.
Summary 4 Regarding Hypothesis 3b, for subjects who chose high eort in the rst
round, endogenous sanctions are signicantly less eective in raising eorts and beliefs
than exogenous sanctions. In fact, the eect of endogenous sanctions cannot be distin-
guished from the eect of not introducing a sanction at all.
245.4 Sanctions and Uncertainty
Naturally, uncertainty about the action of the other player plays a role in the choice
of eort of each player. Although our model is not rich enough to yield hypotheses in
this regard, we now look empirically at the eect of the introduction of an exogenous or
endogenous sanction on this uncertainty.
One of the reasons we asked the participants to specify an interval rather than a point
belief was that the elicited interval provides some indication of the uncertainty about the
behavior of the other player. Schlag and van der Weele (2009) show that for given risk
preferences, changes in the width of the interval correspond to changes in the dispersion
of the distribution. This makes U   L a proxy for the changes in uncertainty of a given
subject. Figure 5 shows the changes in the width of the belief interval for those who

























Interval Width Mean Comparison by Treatment
Figure 5: Means of change in the width of the interval across treatments, for those who chose
the lower belief interval in the rst round in (2 f110;111;:::;165g) in the rst round (number of
independent observations for each sample at the top of the bar).
change between rounds in both no-sanction treatments, while uncertainty went down in
both sanction treatments. We can conrm this result with statistical analysis. Table
8 presents the estimates of stochastic dierence between the rst and the second round
25interval width in all treatments. In both cases with no sanctions a test of stochastic
Stochastic Dierence
EnNS1 vs. EnNS2 ExNS1 vs. ExNS2 EnS1 vs. EnS2 ExS1 vs. ExS2
Interval Width 0:050 0:0  0:28  0:38
Table 8: Estimates of stochastic dierence between the round 1 and round 2, for those who
chose the lower belief interval in the rst round in (2 f110;111;:::;165g) in the rst round.
Results in column 1,2 are for a two-sided test against the null hypothesis that the change is
0, results in column 3,4 for a one-sided test against the null hypothesis that the change in the
interval width is either positive or 0.  Denotes signicance at 10%,  denotes signicance at
5%,  denotes signicance at 1%:.
inequality cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distributions in the two rounds are
equal at the 10% level. By contrast, we nd that there is signicant evidence that the
interval decreases under exogenous sanctions and marginally signicant evidence that
the interval decreases under endogenous sanctions. This reinforces our conclusion that
sanctions facilitate coordination partly by reducing uncertainty about the behavior of
others.
If sanctions were to have a signaling eect, we would expect for those subjects who
chose high eort in the rst round, that the reduction in uncertainty is smaller under
endogenous sanctions than under exogenous sanctions. Testing the direction of the eect
with stochastic inequality, we nd a strongly signicant decrease in uncertainty at 1%
in the exogenous sanction treatment, while under endogenous sanctions it is no longer
signicant.
Summary 5 There is statistically signicant evidence that uncertainty about the choice
of the other player is reduced when sanctions are imposed. This is also true within the
subset of high eort players when the sanction is exogenous. No statistical evidence of
change in uncertainty is found in absence of sanctions or among high eort players when
the sanction is introduced endogenously.
266 Discussion and Conclusion
The results of our experiment allow us to conclusively answer our two questions. Sanctions
have a positive eect on eort levels and beliefs about others' eort level for those that
chose low eort in the rst round. For those that chose high eort their eect depends on
whether sanctions were imposed exogenously or endogenously. In particular, if sanctions
are endogenous then high eort players are more pessimistic, as compared to exogenous
sanctions, which practically eliminates the eectiveness of the sanction.
We nd that the theory that led to our hypotheses is the most plausible explanation
for this result. The endogenous introduction of sanctions signals to subjects with high
eort in round one that their partner did not `cooperate', in the sense that she selected
low eort. This make them more pessimistic about the eort of their partner in the next
round which overrides the incentive eect. The signaling eect also explains why the
eect of the sanction does not depend for those with low eort in the rst round on the
endogeneity. For them there is no signal, as the sanction may be aimed at them rather
than at the other player in the group.
Note that there is another possible explanation for the dierence between endogenous
and exogenous sanctions. Even though the sanction does not operate retroactively, Play-
ers could interpret the introduction of an endogenous sanction as an unkind act by the
principal. If agents have reciprocal preferences, they may retaliate by reducing their eort
in order to lower the payos of the principal. We nd this explanation less convincing
for several reasons. First, the interests of the principal and the agents are completely
aligned, and sanctions are costly. It would therefore be strange to interpret the introduc-
tion of a sanction as anything else than an attempt to raise the minimum eort, which
is in the interest of all the players. Second, the nature of sanctions is such that it hurts
those who play low eort the most. Therefore, one would expect low eort players rather
than high eort players to retaliate against the principal, which is inconsistent with the
data. Third, we consider the following indication of retaliatory punishment: subjects who
choose an eort level below the lower bound of their belief level after being sanctioned
by the principal (but not in the rst round). We nd this behavior in only 2 out of 58
cases, one of which represents a change of only 2 points. Thus, it is hard to reconcile this
evidence with the hypothesis of retaliatory punishment against the principal.
Turning to the real world, the results of the paper have implications for both public
27policies and manager-employee relationships in rms. As pointed out by Brandts and
Cooper (2006), coordination failure can cause corporations and other organizations to
become trapped in unsatisfactory situations both for managers and employee. `Mild
law' has been suggested as a way to improve eciency in coordination environments by
inuencing expectations (McAdams 2000). However, our experiment shows that mild law
has drawbacks that are associated with the signaling eect. Moreover, the experiment
shows that these eects can be quite substantial.
Our experiment leads to policy conclusions that complement those emerging from the
study of Tyran and Feld (2006). In their study, a voting procedure for the introduction of
a mild sanction gives people the opportunity to send a public signal that they are willing to
cooperate. This in turn leads to increased cooperation. Their sanctions are most eective
when chosen endogenously. In our experiment, the introduction is under the discretion of
a third player who has observed past play of the game. This setup reects more closely
the arrangements of a society where people make the laws through representatives, rather
than directly. Our study suggests that `mild law' may not be the best instrument in
this case, because it does not compensate for this signaling eect by providing adequate
incentives for ecient behavior. In our study sanctions are more eective when introduced
exogenously. In fact, our results suggest that policies introduced by voting will also have
a signaling eect, as in the real work the decision to put the vote on the agenda in the
rst place is endogenous.
There some reason to think that the signaling eect may be greater in the real world
than in our experiment. In the experiment, the signaling eect was not present for low
eort players, because the groups were so small that the sanction was likely to reect
their own behavior. However, in real life, relevant communities consist of more than two
people, and sanctions are likely to be implemented only after misbehavior of a substantial
fraction of the group. This means that even people who play low eort may interpret
the sanction as a signal of misconduct of others. Assuming some external validity of
the experiment, one can conclude that a sanctioning authority needs to attain a careful
balance between correcting the behavior of deviants or pessimists and maintaining the
optimistic beliefs of cooperators.
How to attain such a balance is an interesting further research question that goes
beyond the aim of this paper. One possibility is to implementing deterrent laws that would
presumably override the signaling eect. However, such the enforcement may be costly to
28implement and the execution of harsh penalties may not be in line with prevailing norms
of proportionality. Another possibility to investigate is whether appropriate framing of
the introduction of a law can mitigate the signaling eect. In the tradition of experimental
economics, this paper has tried to use neutral framing, replacing \eort" with \a number",
and \sanction" with \subtraction". In real life however, a policy maker could attempt to
surround the introduction of sanctions by soothing or stimulating messages. For example,
one may say the actual number of people who deviate from the ecient strategy is small, or
express the expectation that they will conform to the sanction. However, it is theoretically
unclear why such cheap talk would be eective. The experiments by Brandts and Cooper
(2008) and Van Huyck et al. (1992) incorporate the possibility of a principal to send
written messages and suggestions to the agents. These studies could be combined with
the asymmetric information structure in this paper in order to study this issue.
Last but not least, we hope to promote use of new tests that are exact but do not,
like the WMW test, impose additional distributional assumptions. We think these tests
are an important addition to the toolbox of economists working with small data sets.
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32Appendix A: A Simple Model and Hypotheses
In this section we present a simple model of behavior for the game specied in Section
3.1. A summary is provided in Section 4.
We rst predict behavior for the case where the third player does not have an active
role. To generate predictions we make the following assumptions. Players believe that
they are more sophisticated than their opponents (who we also call partners) and best
respond to anticipated eort of their partner. Partners are believed to best respond to
a given belief distribution of eort levels where these beliefs do not change over time.
Thus, the sophistication of players is as in the models of level k thinking or cognitive
hierarchy (Nagel (1995) and Costa Gomes and Crawford (2006)). In the terminology of
these models, all players in our paper belong to level 2.7
Partners best respond to one of two dierent belief distributions Gh and Gl, accordingly
some choose high while others choose low eort, respectively they are referred to as high
types and low types. Each player assesses a probability or belief p that her partner is the
high type. Players and partners are risk-neutral. Finally, players choose their eort levels
in the rst round as if there was no second round, so completely myopically. This is in
accordance with the experimental setup, where people did not know in the rst round
that there would be a second round.
7.1 First Round Eort
To determine her eort in the rst round, a player will rst calculate the optimal eort
of the high type and of the low type partner and then choose a best response on the basis
of the probability p of meeting the high type. Denote the optimal eort levels of the high
and low type when there is no sanction by eh (0) and el (0) respectively, where 0 indicates
that there is no sanction (in later sections a 1 will indicate that a sanction has been
imposed). So eh (0) 2 argmaxe
 R
minfe;e0gdGh (e0)   ke

where the cost of eort k was
equal to 0:85 in the experiment. We assume that Gh and Gl are such that eh (0) > el (0):
According to our assumptions, each player believes with probability p that she faces a
partner who chooses eh (0) and with probability 1   p a partner who chooses el (0): Let
7At the cost of substantial additional complexity, one could assume more sophisticated distribution of
rationality levels. Specically, specifying higher levels of rationality would lead to more complex belief
eects. We believe that the data do not justify the cost of such an analysis.
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p denote the optimal eort level of a player with belief p in round r; r = 1;2. Note that
e1
p = el (0) if p = 0 and e1
p = eh (0) if p = 1: Taking into account that e1
p 2 [el (0);eh (0)]
holds for all p 2 [0;1] we can write the expected utility of a player with belief p who exerts
eort e 2 [el (0);eh (0)] as Eu = p(e   ke)) + (1   p)(el (0)   ke) and obtain
d
de
Eu = p   k:
So if p > k then e1
p = eh (0); if p < k then e1
p = el (0):
7.2 The Eect of an Exogenous Sanction
We now consider choice of eort in round 2 when an exogenous sanction has been imposed.
Imposing a sanction means to subtract k1 (170   e) from the payo for some given k1 > 0.
In the experiment we set k1 = 0:5: This change in payos inuences eort choices of the
level 1 player. Let ev (1) be the optimal eort of type v 2 fh;lg when there is a sanction.
So eh (1) 2 argmaxe
 R
minfe;e0gdGh (e0)   ke   k1 (170   e)

: Note that ev (1)  ev (0)
for v 2 fh;lg, i.e. partners (are believed to) exert more eort after a sanction has been
imposed.
Expected utility of a player who exerts eort e  el (1) is now
Eu = p(e   ke   k1 (170   e)) + (1   p)(el (1)   ke   k1 (170   e)):
Hence, d
deEu = p (k   k1): If p > k k1 then e2
p = eh (1); if p < k k1 then e2
p = el (1):
Thus, all players exert weakly more eort after an exogenous sanction has been introduced.
We can decompose this change in eort into two eects. First, there is an incentive eect,
because a sanction eectively reduces the cost of eort k and thus gives incentives for
higher eort. Specically, any player with p 2 (k   k1;k) chooses the eort of the high
type in round 2 while they choose the eort of the low type in round 1: Players with
p < k   k1 and p > k choose the same eort in round 2 as they do in round 1: Second,
there is a forward looking belief eect because introducing a sanction leads to a belief
that partners will choose a higher eort as they too face lower eort costs. The forward
looking belief eect additionally raises the eort levels of the players.
We now compare the eect of a sanction on beliefs to their eect on eort levels. For
this we assume that players are drawn from some distribution such that Gp describes the
distribution of p. To simplify exposition assume that Gp has no point masses and full
34support on [0;1]: Then the expected beliefs (in terms of the expected eort of a partner)
in round one equals Z
(peh (0) + (1   p)el (0))dGp (p);




pdGp (p) = Gp (k)el (0) + (1   Gp (k))eh (0):
In order to make eorts and beliefs comparable in round two we impose a mild consis-
tency requirement, namely that expected beliefs equal expected eort in the rst round.
Following the above this means that
R
pdGp (p) = 1   Gp (k):
In round 2, invoking consistency, we nd that expected beliefs equal
Z
(peh (1) + (1   p)el (1))dGp (p) = Gp (k)el (1) + (1   Gp (k))eh (1);
and that expected eort equals
Gp (k   k1)el (1) + (1   Gp (k   k1))eh (1):
Comparing these two terms we conclude for round 2 that expected eort is higher than
expected belief. Given that these two expressions are equal by assumption equal in round
1 we obtain the following result.8
Result 1 Exogenous sanctions increase both beliefs and eort where eort increases more
than beliefs.
Note that in the treatment where no sanction is introduced in round 2; payos and
beliefs remain unchanged and hence e2
p = e1
p, eorts remain unchanged as well.
8Without the consistency requirement, this is is not necessarily true. As a counter-example, consider
the case where high type partners have point beliefs and hence do not respond to lower eort costs.
Assume furthermore that beliefs are such that both players choose high eort in the rst round. As the
eort of the high type partner remains unchanged in round two, players' eort remains unchanged too.
Yet if some probability is put on the low type partners and if these respond to changes in eort cost, we
nd that beliefs move more than eort. However, this scenario occurs only if beliefs are inconsistent in
the sense that rst round eorts are higher than rst round beliefs.
357.3 The Eect of an Endogenous Sanction
Next we investigate behavior when it is the third player, who we refer to as principal, who
chooses whether or not to sanction. The principal's payos are given by 0:25minfe1;e2g 
cs where in our experiment we set c = 4: Note that c=0:25 = 4c is the cost of sanctioning
in units of eorts. The principal is risk neutral and has a prior Gp over the possible values
of belief p held by the players.
We develop some notation. Let ep (s) be the optimal eort given belief p where s = 1
(s = 0) indicates that a sanction has been imposed (has not been imposed). Let pi
be the belief of player i; i = 1;2: Let pm = minfp1;p2g and px = maxfp1;p2g: Let
s : [110;170]





is the choice of the principal of whether
or not to sanction conditional on observed eort level e1
pi of player i in round 1; i = 1;2:
Choices in the rst round are myopic as players do not anticipate that there will be
a second round. We will not consider deviations from such play. Thus, the principal will
observe only eort choices belonging to fel (0);eh (0)g
2 and only needs to condition on
these. We call el (0) and eh (0) a low and a high rst round eort respectively. We will
consider only sanctioning strategies where sanctioning choices do not depend on player
indices but only on eort levels. Thus we can identify s : [110;170]





3 are the sanctioning choices conditional on the rst round
events f(el (0);el (0))g; f(el (0);eh (0));(eh (0);el (0))g and f(eh (0);eh (0))g respectively.
We will make predictions that satisfy the following requirements.
1. The strategies of the principal and the two players can be supported as a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Out of equilibrium actions of the principal do not
change the belief of a player about her partner's eort.
2. The PBE does not depend on the specic form of the prior of the principal.
3. The PBE can be sustained for a non-degenerate interval of values of c.
We make some comments before we turn to the analysis. Given the assumptions
above, a PBE is uniquely characterized by the sanctioning function s (;) of the principal.
Following (2) the equilibrium candidate must be optimal, regardless of the beliefs over p1
and p2. This implies that it will be sucient to evaluate deviations from an equilibrium
candidate using a degenerate prior of the principal, i.e. when the principal is (almost) sure
about p1 and p2. If the principal does not want to deviate under any degenerate prior,
36she will also not want to do so under more general priors. To see this, it suces to note
that expected payos of a deviation under a general prior are just a convex combination
of payos under some degenerate priors, and therefore cannot be strictly higher.
There are 23 = 8 candidates for a PBE. In two of these the principal's choices are
unconditional: s = (1;1;1) and s = (0;0;0): To \always sanction", i.e. s = (1;1;1);
can be supported if and only if epm (1)   4c  epm (0) holds for all pm: Here we use our
requirement that beliefs pi do not change when the principal chooses the out of equilibrium
action to not sanction. Necessary and sucient conditions are given by eh (1) 4c  eh (0)
and el (1)   4c  el (0): When investigating \never sanction", i.e. s = (0;0;0), special
attention must be given to a player with p 2 (k   k1;k). A sanction would induce this
player to switch from low to high eort, this is not in the interest of the principal if
eh (1)   4c  el (0): In fact, this is a necessary and sucient condition for supporting
\never sanction".
An intuitive conditional strategy is given by s = (1;1;0) where the principal sanctions
if and only if at least one of the two players chose a low eort in the rst round. The
conditions supporting this as a PBE emerge when considering three subcases. When
both players chose low rst round eort then s prescribes to sanction is best when
epm (1)   4c  el (0) holds for all pm; hence when el (1)   4c  el (0): When both exerted
high eort in the rst round, then s = 0 which is best if eh (0)  el (1)   4c: Finally,
consider the case where one player had a low and the other a high rst round eort. Then
s = 1 which yields outcome el (1)   4c as the player with high rst round eort now
believes that her opponent is of low type. Not sanctioning causes the player with low rst
round eort to choose epi (0) = el (0) and the one with high rst round eort to choose
eh (0); which is worse if el (1)   4c  el (0). Together this means that s = (1;1;0) can
be supported if and only if eh (0)  el (1)   4c  el (0): Note that in this equilibrium,
sanctions are \bad news" in the sense that playing s = 1 will alert a high eort player
to the fact that her opponent played low eort.
The ve remaining strategies can all be ruled out by our requirements 1   3. It is
easy to show that s = (0;1;0), s = (0;1;1), s = (0;0;1) cannot be supported at PBE.
Moreover, one can rule out s = (1;0;0) and s = (1;0;1) using requirement 3. We
summarize:
Proposition 1 The following values of s are the only ones that can be supported as
a PBE for all Gp for a nondegenerate set of c: (i) (1;1;1) if ev (1)   4c > ev (0) for
37v 2 fl;hg; (ii) (1;1;0) if eh (0) > el (1)   4c > el (0), (iii) (0;0;0) if eh (1)   4c < el (0):
Proposition 1 implies that there is no unique prediction for whether or not the principal
will sanction low types or whether or not she will sanction high types. With respect to
players 1 and 2, their eorts remain unchanged if there is no sanction. Players with low
rst round eort who are sanctioned increase eort in the same way as under an exogenous
sanction, because the sanctions do not change the belief about the type of player she is
facing. However, the predicted change in eort of a player with high rst round eort is
ambiguous. She will increase eort in case (i), but when sanctions are \bad news" as in
case (ii), she may reduce eort.
Appendix B: Stochastic Dierence and Inequality
In the following we present a new exact nonparametric test for comparing outcomes
based on two independent samples due to Schlag (2008). It is specically designed to
uncover with small samples how two distributions dier without adding distributional
assumptions. Previous such tests can only identify that the two distributions dier but not
how they dier, respective the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test see Forsythe et al. (1994).
Given two random variables Y1 and Y2,  (Y1;Y2) = Pr(Y2 > Y1) Pr(Y2 < Y1) is called
the stochastic dierence of Y1 verses Y2 (Cli, 1993). The stochastic dierence can be
estimated by computing the sample analogues. Consider rst the case of matched pairs
where data is given by joint observations of Y1 and Y2. The estimate is calculated by
ignoring all pairs in which Y1 = Y2 and then taking the dierence between the empirical
frequency of pairs with Y2 > Y1 and of pairs in which Y2 < Y1. Now consider the case
in which there are two independent samples, one associated to each variable. Here one
can estimate  by considering the frequency of Y2 > Y1 among all possible pairs and
subtracting from this the frequency in which Y2 < Y1 among all these pairs. The resulting
estimates are unbiased.
If  (Y1;Y2) > 0 then one says that Y2 tends to yield larger outcomes than Y1: We
wish to identify signicant evidence that Y2 tends to yield larger outcomes than Y1: So
we wish to test the null hypothesis H0 :  (Y1;Y2)  0 against the alternative hypothesis
H1 :  (Y1;Y2) > 0 for a given specied level : Following Vargha and Delaney (1998) we
call this a test of stochastic inequality (see also Brunner and Munzel, 2000).
38Assume that data has the form of matched pairs as given by n independent observations
of (Y1;Y2): Then this test reduces to a sign test. One uses a binomial test to test whether
the probability that Y2 > Y1 conditional on Y2 6= Y1 is  1=2.
Assume instead that data is given by two independent samples of Y1 and of Y2. Let ni
be the number of observations of Yi; i = 1;2: The new test proceeds as follows. Randomly
match one observation from each sample to generate minfn1;n2g matched pairs. Act
as if these matched pairs are the original sample and determine the rejection probability
of the randomized version of the sign test that has size 0:2  . Repeat the last two
steps, matching and evaluating the rejection probability, innitely often and record the
average rejection probability. Finally, reject the null hypothesis if the average rejection
probability is above 0:2. Note that the factor 0:2 used to reduce the size of the randomized
test is equal to the threshold used to translate the randomized recommendation into a
deterministic recommendation.
Appendix C: Instructions [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
We report instructions for the endogenous sanction treatment, which are the most com-
prehensive. Original instructions were in Italian.
Instructions for the rst round
Introduction
Welcome! You are going to take part in an experimental study of decision making. Please
follow these instructions carefully. You will be paid according to your performance. At
the end of the experiment we will tell you how much you earned.
Once everyone is seated we will formally start the experiment by reading the instruc-
tions. After this reading you will have the opportunity to ask us questions about the
procedure. However at no time may you communicate with any of the other participants
of your session. Please also refrain from talking to others about your experience until
tomorrow in order not to inuence others taking part in our experiment. Please turn o
your mobiles in case they are still switched on.
39Matching and assignment to a role
The computer will assign you by chance (i.e. at random) to a group consisting of three
participants. You will not know the identity of the other two in your group and they will
not know your identity. The computer will also assign a role to each in this group. Two of
this group (from now on: player 1 and player 2) will have to take a decision as described
below, the third (from now on: player 3) will be inactive but still will earn some money.
Decisions and Earnings
During the experiment any choice will lead to some earnings expressed in tokens. Total
earnings at the end of the experiment are determined by the sum of all earnings and will
then be converted into money at the exchange rate of
1 token = 7;5 Eurocents (or equivalently: 100 tokens= 7;5 Euro)
It will not be possible to have negative earnings at the end.
Player 1 and Player 2
Players 1 and 2 will simultaneously each be asked to make two decisions: to choose
a number and to make a guess about which number the other player chooses. Both
decisions have to be entered into a decision screen that is described in more detail below.
Neither player will observe the decisions of the other player.
Choosing a Number
Both player 1 and player 2 have to choose a number. This number can be any number
between and including 110 and 170 (fractions or decimals not allowed).
The earnings in tokens of either player 1 or player 2 from choosing a number are
determined as follows. A player receives the lower of the two numbers chosen by player 1
and player 2 minus 85% of their own number.
This has the following implications:
 Assume players 1 and 2 chose the same number. Then a player will receive his/her
own number (since both numbers are equal, this is also the lowest number) minus
85% of his/her own number.
40 Assume that players 1 and 2 chose dierent numbers. Then, the player who chose
the lower number could have increased his earnings by choosing a slightly higher
number. However, the player who chose the higher number could have increased his
earnings by choosing a slightly lower number.
The following mathematical representation will not be read out loud.
Suppose (among players 1 and 2) that one of them chooses the number Y and the
other chooses the number Z.
If Y = Z then the player who chose Y receives Y   0:85  Y .
If Y < Z then the player who chose Y receives Y   0:85  Y .
If Y > Z then player who chose Y receives Z   0:85  Y .
In addition, players 1 and 2 rst receive a xed amount of 35 tokens.
Guessing the other's choice
In addition to specifying a number, both player 1 and player 2 are asked to make a guess
about the number chosen by the other player. The guess is made by specifying a range
(given by its lower bound L and its upper bound U) in which the other player's choice is
believed to belong.
The earnings in tokens of either player 1 or player 2 from making this guess are
determined as follows. A wrong guess (the actual number chosen by the other player falls
outside the specied range) yields nothing. A correct guess (the actual number chosen by
the other player lies within the specied range) yields 15% of the dierence between 60
and the width of the range U   L. Therefore the smaller the specied range, the higher
the earnings if the guess is correct. However, a smaller range also increases the risk that
the guess is not correct, in which case no tokens are earned.
(The following mathematical representation will not be read out loud:
If the number Z chosen by the other player lies in the range (it is greater than or
equal to L and less than or equal to U) then the player who has chosen L and U gets
0:15(60 (U  L)) tokens if this number Z does not lie within the range then the player
who has chosen L and U gets nothing.)
41 
 
Figure 1: Input screen in the rst round.
Player 3
Player 3 does not make any decision during the experiment and earns an amount of tokens
equal to 25% of the smaller of the two numbers chosen by players 1 and 2.
A more mathematical representation of this statement will not be read out loud:
Tokens earned by player three = 0:25 (smaller of the two numbers chosen by player
1 and player 2)
Tutorial
Before the experiment starts, so before roles are assigned, all participants have the pos-
sibility to practice and to get used to the structure of the game. To this end, you will
participate in a tutorial round, where you will see the decision screen as described above.
You will have 5 minutes to enter as many dierent values as you like for both your own
number and your guess, and the other player's hypothetical number. You can then use the
check button to see what your earnings from these numbers and your guess would be. You
are encouraged to verify the calculation behind the earnings of both the number choice
and the guess. The values entered in this tutorial have no inuence on your earnings and
will not be recorded. After 5 minutes the tutorial will stop and the experiment will start.
42Final Remarks
During the experiment, you are not permitted to speak or communicate with the other
participants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, please raise your
hand and one of the experimenters will come and answer it.
At this time, do you have any questions about the instructions or procedures? If you
have a question, please raise your hands and one of the experimenters will come to your
seat to answer it.
Instructions for the second round
Introduction
Now we run a second and nal experiment. Earnings will be added to your previous
earnings. After this new experiment everything is over and your total payment will be
calculated.
This new experiment is very similar to the previous one up to some changes we high-
light.
Matching and roles
All participants are matched with the same people as before and keep the roles they had
before.
Decisions and Earnings
IN CONTRAST to the previous experiment, player 3 now also makes a decision.
Player 3
At the start of the experiment, before player 1 and 2 make any decisions, player 3 observes
the numbers chosen by players 1 and 2 in the previous experiment. After having observed
these numbers, player 3 makes a decision that determines how earnings of players 1 and 2
are calculated in this new experiment. The outcome of this decision is observed by players
1 and 2 before they make their choices. Player 3 has the following two choices:
43a) NOT CHANGE: To choose \not change" means that the earnings of all players
are as in the previous experiment. In particular, player 3 earns 25% of the smaller of the
two numbers chosen by players 1 and 2.
b) CHANGE: To choose \change" means that earnings in tokens of all players are
changed as follows. Players 1 and 2 receive the lower of the two numbers chosen minus
85% of their own number minus 50% of the dierence between 170 and the player's own
chosen number. That is, relative to the previous experiment, there is an extra amount
subtracted to your earnings that is larger the smaller your number is. Player 3 earns 25%
of the smaller of the two numbers chosen by players 1 and 2 minus 4. The terms that are
new as compared to the previous experiment have been underlined.
This mathematical illustration will not be read out loud:
Suppose player 3 chooses \change" and (among players 1 and 2) that one of them
chooses the number Y and the other chooses the number Z.
If Y = Z then the player who chose Y receives Y   0:85  Y   0:5  (170   Y ).
and player 3 receives 0:25  Y   4.
If Y < Z then the player who chose Y receives Y   0:85  Y   0:5  (170   Y ).
and player 3 receives 0:25  Y   4.
If Y > Z then player who chose Y gets Z   0:85  Y   0:5  (170   Y )
and player 3 receives 0:25  Z   4.
Regardless of the choice of player 3, player 1 and 2 also receive a xed amount of 35
tokens.
Player 1 and Player 2
As in the previous experiment, players 1 and 2 make two decisions: choose a number
and make a guess by specifying a range. Earnings from making the guess are as in the
previous experiment, earnings from choosing a number are specied above.
Input Screen here
Final Remarks
If you have any questions then please ask them now. Please do not log o the computer
when the experiment is over.
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